APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
PINE BLUFF DIVISION

H. Brent Davis,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College, a body corporate; and Dr. Homer Babin, President of Arkansas A & M College,

Defendants.

No. PB 66 C-76

ORDER OVERRULING MOTION TO DISMISS

This is an action by the plaintiff, H. Brent Davis, against the Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College and its President, Dr. Homer Babin, under provisions of the Civil Rights Act 28 U.S.C.A. §1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. The jurisdiction of the court is further invoked pursuant to provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §1332(a) (1) as between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

The jurisdiction of the Court is further based on the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §1331(a) as the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The plaintiff seeks redress, the deprivation under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution

and laws of the United States. Both damages and injunctive reliefs are sought as a result of alleged termination of the plaintiff from employment by the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas A & M College.

A motion to dismiss the action was filed by the defendants pursuant to Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In their motion to dismiss the defendants claim (1) state immunity, (2) the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (3) that the complaint is based on a breach of contract in seeking damages in tort. It is, therefore, urged that the complaint be dismissed (a) because the court has no jurisdiction over the matter or (b) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is undisputed that Arkansas A & M College is a body corporate chartered under the laws of the State of Arkansas, maintained and operated under the supervision of a Board of Trustees and that Dr. Homer Babin is and was President of the college at the time of the alleged termination of the plaintiff as a member of the faculty. There is no question about the plaintiff, H. Brent Davis, having been employed as a member of the faculty of the College under a written contract commencing August 3, 1965, and continuing until May 31, 1966, at a salary of $6,000. It appears as a matter of fact that such employment was terminated October 31, 1965, in a letter dated October 29, 1965, from President Babin to plaintiff Davis in accordance with a policy decision made by the Board of Trustees of the College at its scheduled meeting October 28, 1965.

The Court has the benefit of well prepared briefs by both parties and is impressed with the contention of each

of the parties to this action. The Court is not pursuaded from the record of the case that it is lacking in jurisdiction or that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Arkansas Agricultural and Mechanical College was created by the General Assembly of Arkansas, April 1, 1909, and is one of four schools divided into districts for the teaching of agriculture, horticulture, and the art of textile manufacturing. Ark. Stats. Anno. 80-3101-2.

The College was designated as the "Agricultural and Mechanical College" of the Fourth District of Arkansas by the General Assembly in 1925, governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor with specific powers and terms of office to provide a course of study in various fields of education. Ark. Stats. Anno. 80-3103-4.

The official name of the College became known and designated as "Agricultural and Mechanical College" by act of the legislature in 1939. Ark. Stats. Anno. 80-3106.

The Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas creating the College provided for a Board of Trustees with powers, authority and duty in the management, expansion, improvement and operation of the College which became a lawful corporate body. The Board of Trustees was authorized to make rules and regulations for the maintenance, development and operation of the college, including the employment of faculty and other employees. In providing a course of study the Board of Trustees was authorized to make provisions for students and their welfare and to perform any and all duties for the operation of the institution as a senior college. Ark. Stats. Anno. 80-3107, et seq., 80-3131.

The Court is of the opinion that it is a body "politic" with a board vested in corporate powers and as such may sue and be sued as a legal intity.

28 U.S.C.A. §1343(3) provides the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.

42 U.S.C.A. §1983 provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.

28 U.S.C.A. §1332(a) (1) provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction in civil actions of diversity of citizenship where the matter in controversey exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

Also, 28 U.S.C.A. §1331(a) provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

From the record of the case it is undisputed that the plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Texas, and was at the time of the filing of this action. The amount in controversy as alleged in the complaint exceeds the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. In the opinion of the Court this is a diversity action and the amount in controversy brings it within the jurisdiction of the Court. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332(a) (1); *Antelope* v. *George,* 211 F.S. 657; *Hague* v. *CIO,* 101 F. 2d 744, 789.

The Court is of the opinion that this is a federal question in which the United States District Court has jurisdiction in that the allegations of the complaint brings it within the provisions referred to hereinabove, including rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The question then evolved in this proceeding is whether or not there are present elements necessary to establish a claim for damages under civil rights laws. In a civil rights action where plaintiff seeks damages as well as injunctive relief, as in this case, the only elements necessary in order to establish a claim are (1) the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of State law and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to deprivation or rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. *Marshall* v. *Sawyer,* 301 F. 2d 639, 646. Since the defendants were clothed with the authority of the State and purporting to act thereunder, such conduct was engaged in under color of State law. *Marshall* v. *Sawyer, supra,* (cases cited therein).

It is undenied and the record is clear that the plaintiff publically criticized certain actions in the treatment

of prisoners in the State Penitentiary. It is apparent that the President of the College called the plaintiff to his office and in his capacity as President, acting by the authority of the Board of Trustees, cautioned the plaintiff, as a member of the faculty, against public statements critical of the treatment of prisoners. The record is clear that certain publicity occurred subsequently involving the plaintiff, which resulted in the action of the Board and subsequent dismissal of the plaintiff as a member of the faculty. The Court is of the opinion that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to deprivation of his position as a member of the faculty which raises a question that can be determined only by testimony as to the privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution.

It is admitted that this is an action in tort. As has been stated, this suit involves the deprivation of civil rights. An individual thus deprived is given a right of action at law. Such an action sounds in tort and exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded. *Hague* v. *CIO, supra,* (cases cited therein, page 789); *Antelope* v. *George, supra; Monroe* v. *Pape,* 365 U.S. 168.

It appearing to the Court that it has jurisdiction of this case and that the complaint establishes a claim upon which relief can be granted, the motion to dismiss will be overruled.

It is, Therefore, Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that the motion to dismiss the complaint herein be and the same is hereby overruled.

Dated: September 1, 1967.

Oren Harris
United States District Judge

Filed: September 5, 1967.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 19,015.

Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College, a body corporate; and Dr. Homer Babin, President of Arkansas A & M College, Appellants,

v.

H. Brent Davis, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

[June 24, 1968.]

Before Van Oosterhout, Chief Judge; Matthes and Lay, Circuit Judges.

Matthes, Circuit Judge.

This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) from an order of the District Court denying defendants' motion to dismiss. The parties will be designated as they were in the lower Court.

According to the Complaint, H. Brent Davis, plaintiff, a citizen of the State of Texas, was employed pursuant to a written contract with the Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College[1] to teach in the Department of

[1]Arkansas A & M College is a body corporate, created by the General Assembly of Arkansas on April 1, 1909 and governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor of that State. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§80-3101 et seq. Defendant Dr. Homer Babin is president of the College.

Languages and Literature of that College from August 1, 1965 to May 31, 1966 at a salary of $6,000.00. The complaint alleged that on October 29, 1965 the Board of Trustees, acting through "its employee and agent defendant, Dr. Homer Babin," dismissed plaintiff without stating the reasons for his dismissal and without affording him a hearing in which to answer the charges against him.[2] Plaintiff averred that the termination of his employment was a direct consequence of his activities relating to the abolition of corporal punishment in the Arkansas State Penitentiary and the ensuing publicity through the news media; that he had prepared a petition against corporal punishment, which was endorsed by "several" students.

The complaint further alleged that defendants, in summarily dismissing plaintiff, had deprived him of his constitutional rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and had unlawfully breached the contract of employment to his irreparable loss, injury and harm.

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to restore him to his former position with backpay and to restrain the defendants from thereafter terminating his employment by reason of activities protected by the federal constitution. He also prayed for a judgment for $25,000.00 in damages resulting from "family disruption, incon-

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[2]The letter of dismissal stated:

"In accordance with a policy decision made by the Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College at its scheduled meeting on October 28, 1965, you are hereby dismissed from the faculty of Arkansas A & M College, effective October 31, 1965. The Administration concurs in this decision.

"You are directed to vacate your office and campus apartment at the earliest possible moment."

venience, damage to reputation, inability to find other employment, [and] physical, mental and emotional suffering."

Defendants premised their motion to dismiss on (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by reason of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; (2) failure of the complaint to state a claim for relief.

In its unreported order denying the motion the District Court refrained from specific discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue. It found that jurisdiction existed for the reason that (a) Arkansas A & M College, organized pursuant to Sections 80-3101 — 80-3102, Ark. Stat. Ann., is a body "politic" and as such may sue and be sued as a legal entity; (b) the Civil Rights Statutes, 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. §1983 explicitly confer jurisdiction; (c) the complaint alleges diversity of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional amount under 28 U.S.C. §1332; (d) there exists a federal question under the privileges and immunities and due process clauses of the Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §1331. In concluding that the complaint also asserted a claim for relief the Court stated:

> "The Court is of the opinion that such conduct [by the Board of Trustees] subjected the plaintiff to deprivation of his position as a member of the faculty which raises a question which can be determined only by testimony as to the privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution."

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

> "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one

> of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

The nub of defendants' position is that since Arkansas A & M College is a creature of the State and an agency of it, the trustees partake of its sovereign immunity. They equate this action therefore with one in which the state is named defendant. See *Arkansas* v. *Texas*, 346 U.S. 368, 370 (1953).

Plaintiff does not dispute that Arkansas A & M College is a state agency. He stands on the proposition, however, with which we agree, that sovereign immunity does not extend to state or federal officials who act beyond their authority or in violation of the United States Constitution.

The foundation case is *Ex Parte Young*,[3] 209 U.S. 123 (1908), where the Supreme Court held that a suit against the Attorney General of Minnesota to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute did not violate the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. In rejecting the claim of state immunity the Court announced this basic principle:

> "The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of

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[3]Petitioner Edward T. Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, had been held in contempt by a United States Court in Minnesota for refusing to obey an order of that Court restraining him from enforcing the provisions of a rate-fixing statute of the State of Minnesota. The case came to the Supreme Court on Young's original application in that Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

> the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United State. See *In re Ayers, supra,* page 507." 209 U.S. at 159-160.

Kenneth Culp Davis, who discusses the rationale of the *Young* decision in his administrative law treatise, states:

> " • • • [The Court] was deliberately indulging in fiction in order to find a way around sovereign immunity. It knew that the injunction against the attorney general was in truth a means of preventing the state from enforcing the statute. The reality is all too obvious that the suit was in practical effect a suit against the state." 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §27.03 at 553.

As Davis recogniezs, however, the principle underlying the *Young* case, even though founded upon fiction, has become firmly implanted in the law. It has been applied not only to enjoin unconstitutional state legislation, as in *Young,* but also to challenge unconstitutional activities by state officials. In *Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.* v. *Redwine, State Revenue Commissioner,* 342 U.S. 299 (1952), an action to enjoin the collection of taxes which allegedly impaired the obligation of contract between plaintiff and the State of Georgia in violation of the federal constitution, a unanimous Court stated:

> "This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State. These decisions were reexamined and reaffirmed in *Ex Parte Young,* 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and have been consistently followed to the present day." 342 U.S. at 304.

As late as 1964, the Supreme Court reaffirmed *Ex parte Young in Griffin* v. *County School Board of Prince Edward County,* 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964):

> "It is contended that the case is an action against the state, is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore should be dismissed. The complaint, however, charged that state and county officials were depriving petitioners of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been settled law since *Ex parte Young,* 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that suits against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment." 377 U.S. at 228.

See also *Wasson* v. *Trowbridge,* 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967), (suit to enjoin the dismissal of a student from the Merchant Marine Academy without a hearing in alleged violation of his constitutional rights); *Louisiana State Board of Education* v. *Allen,* 287 F.2d 32, 33 (5th Cir. 1961), *cert. denied,* 368 U.S. 830 (1961), (action to enjoin State Board of Education from excluding Negroes from a trade school); *Orleans Parish School Board* v. *Bush,* 242 F.2d 156, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1957), *cert. denied,* 354 U.S. 921 (1957), (suit by Negro students against parish school board and others for declaratory judgment that state constitutional provision and statutes designed to maintain school segregation were invalid, and for injunctive relief ending such segregation): *Arkansas State*

Highway Commission v. *Butler*, 105 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1939), (suit to enjoin operation of free ferry by agents of state of Arkansas in alleged violation of bridge company's constitutional rights).

We are persuaded to conclude on the basis of the complaint and attached exhibits that this case falls within the doctrine promulgated in *Ex parte Young* and adhered to by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. The substance of the complaint is that the Board of Trustees and the President, in dismissing plaintiff, deprived him of his constitutional rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, if the defendants transcended their lawful authority as representatives of the College and wrongfully dismissed plaintiff in violation of the Constitution, they were in effect divested of their official capacity as agents of the State. See *Waller* v. *Professional Insurance Corporation*, 299 F. 2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1962). Without the cloak of valid state authority to immunize defendants' actions plaintiff is allowed a remedy against them individually. *Ford Motor Co.* v. *Department of Treasury of Indiana*, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945). We hold that the District Court properly assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the pleaded allegations and that plaintiff's suit is not a prohibited action against the State of Arkansas or one of its agencies within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.[4]

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[4] In contrast, where the case does not present a constitutional issue and the state is the real party in interest, the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment will apply. **Hamilton Manufacturing Company v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado**, 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th Cir. 1966); **Scott v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State U.**, 336 F.2d 557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1964); **Wihtol v. Crow**, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1962); **De Levay v. Richmond County School Board**, 284 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1960); **O'Neill v. Early**, 208 F.2d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1953); **Gainer v. School Board of Jefferson County, Alabama**, 135 F. Supp. 559, 569-70 (N. D. Ala. 1955).

SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

42 U.S.C. §1983 provides in pertinent part:

> "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."[5]

It is apparent from the order denying the motion to dismiss that the District Court was of the view that the individual members of the Board of Trustees, although not named, and Dr. Babin acted under color of state law in subjecting plaintiff to deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.[6]

We have carefully examined the complaint in light of the controlling authorities and are persuaded to hold that it does state a claim for relief under §1983 against the individual members of the Board and Dr. Babin.[7] *Cf. Birnbaum* v. *Trussell,* 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); *Smith* v. *Board of Education of Morrilton School Dist.,* 365 F. 2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); *Johnson* v. *Branch,* 364 F. 2d

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[5]Title 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) provides that the District Court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

[6]The Court stated:

> "Since the defendants were clothed with the authority of the State and purporting to act thereunder, such conduct was engaged in under color of State law."

[7]In so holding we are assuming that the Court was vested with jurisdiction over the persons of the individuals composing the Board of Trustees.

177 (4th Cir. 1966), *cert. denied*, 385 U.S. 1003 (1966); *Marshall* v. *Sawyer*, 301 F. 2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). Our holding is not to be interpreted to mean that the complaint states a claim for relief against the College or the State of Arkansas.

THE REMEDY

We are not inclined to indulge in instructions as to the procedure to be followed or the relief, if any, to be granted. If upon a trial the District Court finds that the Trustees and the President did, in fact, subject plaintiff to deprivation of his constitutional rights, we have confidence that the Court will formulate such relief as will be just and appropriate.

The order denying defendants' motion to dismiss is affirmed.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 19015

Board of Trustees of Arkansas A. & M. College, etc., et al., Appellants, vs. H. Brent Davis.	Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

On consideration of the motion of appellants for a further stay of the mandate in this cause pending a petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, it is now here ordered by this Court

that the issuance of the mandate herein be, and the same is hereby, further stayed to and including September 16, 1968. If within said period of time there is filed with the Clerk of this Court a certificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States that a petition for writ of certiorari and record have been filed, the further stay hereby granted shall continue until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court.

August 16, 1968.